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Jason Holden*
I. INTRODUCTION
Question: So that's why this whole 1983jury trial or not seems to me
largely academic, not having any continuing importance.
Mr Berger- It could have little continuing importance, I would - -
Question: It's certainly not academic in your case, though, is it?
Mr Berger- In this case it was the heart of the case.'
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court handed down the much antici-
pated2 regulatory taking decision of City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, Ltd. Remarkably, for the first time the Court affirmed a jury's
verdict finding a regulatory taking and awarding just compensation to a prop-
erty owner? Normally a regulatory taking decision receives a great deal of
attention; however, the Court's decision in Del Monte Dunes and the issues it
addressed received little attention.4
* J.D. expected 2001 University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, Mont.
1. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 31-32, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999) [hereinafter Del Monte Dunes].
2. See Philip Weinberg, Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey: Will the Supreme Court Stretch the
Takings Clause Beyond the Breaking Point?, 26 B.C. ENvTL AFF. L. REv. 315 (1999).
3. The compensation awarded to the property owner amounted to $1,450,000.
4. Michael M. Berger, counsel for Del Monte Dunes remarked on the reaction to the decision by
stating that: "I think it's important to note the interesting governmental spin that's been following this
decision. The party line that is coming from the regulators is that the property owners failed to make any
huge advances in this case. What they overlook is that we weren't trying to change the law, or to get the
Supreme Court to acknowledge precepts we always thought were the law but that were not yet spelled out
clearly. Unlike the usual case that has been in the Supreme Court during the past couple decades, the
property owners were playing defense. What we were trying to do was to hold on to the positive law that
the Supreme Court has laid down. It was the City that was trying to change the law. The City wanted to
establish a general rule of immunity from courts reviewing the merits of regulatory actions. If the City and
its amci had been able to establish that, it would have been big news indeed. But don't be misled by the
governmental down-playing of the what the owners did or did not accomplish here. What we accomplished
was to preserve the concept of regulatory takings." Dwight H. Merriam, The Un ited States Supreme Court's
Decision in Del Monte Dunes: The Views of two Opinion Leaders, SE18 A.L.L-A.B.A. 297, 315 (1999).
146 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW [Vol.21
Justice Kennedy, 5 writing the 5-4 decision for the Court, addressed three
issues: 1) whether questions of liability in an inverse condemnation action
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 19836 can properly be submitted to a jury, 2)
whether the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit impermissib-
ly based its decision on a standard that allowed a jury to reweigh the reason-
ableness of a city's land use decision, and 3) whether the Ninth Circuit erred
in assuming that the rough proportionality standard announced in Dolan v
City of Tigard7 applied to the facts presented for review 8
As the above quoted excerpt from oral argument indicates, the controlling
issue in Del Monte Dunes was whether under § 1983 the case was properly
submitted to ajury Due to the unusual Seventh Amendment9 character of the
controlling issue, a student, professor or practitioner interested in the regula-
tory takings doctrine may at first disregard the decision as mere Seventh
Amendment precedent; 0 however, the Court's decision in Del Monte Dunes
should not be ignored. Particularly important in Del Monte Dunes is the
Court's reasoning in deciding the controlling issue. Specifically, the Court's
underlying reasoning focused on two regulatory taking decisions: First Eng-
lish Evangelical Lutheran Church v County of Los Angeles, " and Williamson
County Regional Planning Commission v Hamilton Bank.'2  Because the
Court's reasoning specifically implicates the ripeness doctnne, the Court's
holding in Del Monte Dunes may be academically important, but practically
irrelevant.
Section II of this note examnes both the factual and procedural background
of Del Monte Dunes. Section III discusses the Court's reasoning and holding
on all three issues presented for review Section IV focuses on the Court's
5. Joining Justice Kennedy were ChiefJustice Rehnquist, Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens, and Justice
Scalia. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. The dissenting
opinion was written by Justice Souter who was joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Ginsberg, and Justice
Breyer. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 692.
6. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depnvation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against ajudicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declara-
tory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the Distnct
of Columbia. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
7. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
8. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 702.
9. In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of
the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
10. See generally The Supreme Court, 1999 Term -- Leading Cases, 113 HARv. L. REV. 200,296-306
(1999) (explaining the Seventh Amendment precedential value of Del Monte Dunes).
It. 482U.S.304(1987).
12. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
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decision on the controlling issue as it relates to the ripeness doctrine, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine and concerns for resjudicata and collateral estoppel.
Section V concludes that while the Court's decision in Del Monte Dunes was
a victory for the regulatory takings doctrine, it will further complicate an area
of the law already compounded by a set of complex legal principles.
]I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The property at issue in Del Monte Dunes consists of a 37.6 acre ocean front
parcel located in the city of Monterey, California. 13 With the exception of the
Pacific Ocean and a state beach park located to its northeast, the property was
surrounded by a railroad right of way and properties devoted to industrial,
commercial, and multifamily residential uses.14 The property was zoned under
the city's general zoning ordinance for multifamily residential use, which
allowed twenty-nine umts per acre, or more than 1,000 units for the entire
parcel.15
Since before the Second World War, the property was used by the Phillips
Petroleum Company (Phillips) as a terminal and tank farm where large quanti-
ties of oil were delivered, stored, and shipped. 6 When Phillips ceased using
the property it left behind several tank pads, an industrial complex, pieces of
pipe, broken concrete, oil soaked sand, and trash. 7 In addition, a sewer line
housed in a 15-foot man-made dune, covered withjute matting and surrounded
by snow fencing, occupied the property 18 By the early 1980s, the property
was essentially an abandoned industrial site that needed cleaning and restora-
tion before it could be developed.
Phillips also introduced the non-native ice plant to the property to prevent
erosion and control soil conditions around its oil tanks.'9 As the ice plants
covered the property they secreted a substance that forced out other native
plants, including the buckwheat plant, the only known habitat for an endan-
gered insect known as Smith's Blue Butterfly 2 0 The butterfly lives for one
week, travels a maximum of 200 feet, and must land on a mature flowering
buckwheat plant to survive.2' From 1981 through 1985 only a single larva of
the butterfly was discovered on the property 22
In 1981, Ponderosa Homes applied for permission to develop the property
13. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 694.
14. Id.
15. Id
16. Id at 695.
17. Id
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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in accordance with the city's zoning and general plan requirements.23 The
original proposal was limited to a development of 344 residential units.24 The
city's planning commission requested that an Environmental Impact Report
(EIR) be prepared to assess the potential effects the residential development
would have on the environment.25 The draft of the EIR for the 344-unit devel-
opment was completed in January 1982.26 In August 1982, the city's planning
commssion denied the application, but stated that a proposal for a 264-unit
development would receive favorable consideration. 27 Ponderosa then submit-
ted a proposal for a 264-unit development. However, in December 1983 the
planning commission denied the application again.2 8 The planning commis-
sion requested another reduction in the scale of the development, stating that
a proposal for a 224-unit development would be received with favor.29 But in
early 1984, the planning commission also denied the application for the 224-
unit development.3" Ponderosa then appealed to the city council, which in
March 1984 overruled the planning commission's denial of the 224-unit devel-
opment and referred the project back to the planning commission, with instruc-
tions to consider a proposal for a 190 unit development plan.31
Ponderosa again reduced the scope of the development to comply with the
city's request, and subitted four detailed site plans, each consisting of 190
units.32 While the 190 unit development plan was pending, Del Monte Dunes
at Monterey, Ltd. purchased the property from Ponderosa for $3,700,000. In
July 1984, the planning comnission rejected the application for the 190-unit
development.33 Del Monte appealed to the city council, which in September
1984 overruled the planning commission and in Resolution Number 84-16031
23. Id. at 695.
24. Id.
25. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 920 F.2d 1496, 1502 (1990) [hereinafter
Del Monte 1].
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. WHEREAS, the Planning Commission having previously denied the proposed site plan for a 190
unit condominium project at 2301 Del Monte Avenue, the City Council did entertain an appeal therefrom;
and WHEREAS, the City Council does find that the site plan as proposed is conceptually satisfactory and
is in conformance with previous decisions of this Council regarding density, number of units, location on
the property, and in other respects; NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE
CITY OFMONTEREY that the decision of the Planning Commission denying the site plan for this develop-
ment is hereby overruled, and the site plan known as Scheme D dated August 30, 1984, is hereby approved
subject to the conditions of approval attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit A.
The conditions set forth on Exhibit A were as follows:
1. Conditions mandating conformity with scheme D
2. Submission to the Architectural Review Committee
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approved the 190- unit development plan subject to fifteen conditions, includ-
ing the dedication of a large portion of the property to public use.
Del Monte then spent the next year revising the 190-umt development plan,
as well as taking other steps to fulfill the city's conditions.35 Del Monte's final
190-unit development plan devoted 17.9 acres to public open space, 7.9 acres
to open, landscaped areas, 6.7 acres to public and private streets, and 5.1 acres
to buildings and patios.36 In July 1985, the city's Architectural Review Com-
mittee (ARC) gave concept approval for the 190-unit development plan.37
In January 1986, less than two months before the expiration of Del Monte's
conditional use permit, the planning commission acted against the ARC's
recommendation and demed the 190-umt development plan.3" Again, Del
Monte appealed the decision to the city council and sought a twelve month
extension of the conditional use permit to allow time to comply with addi-
tional requirements that might be imposed.39 The conditional use permit was
extended until a hearing could be held before the city council in June 1986.
After the June hearing, the city council demed the 190 unit development plan,
not only declimng to specify measures Del Monte could take to satisfy the city
council's concerns, but also refusing to extend the use permit to allow time to
address the concerns.41 The city council did not base its decision on Del
Monte's failure to meet any of the specific conditions prescribed by the city
in Resolution Number 84-160. Rather, the city council stated generally in
Resolution Number 86-9642 its reasoning why the 190-umt development plan
3. Approval of Snuth's Blue Butterfly habitat preservation by California Department of Fish and Game
and U.S. Fish and Wildlife
4. Protection of rare plants
5. Approval of Access
6. Approval of Fencing
7. Approval of Grading
8. Underground Utilities
9. Approval by Fire Department
10. Approval by Department of Public Works
11. Approval of Homeowners Association Agreement
12. Soundproofing between units
13. Payment of Park Dedication Fee
14. Provision of moderate income housing
15. Duration of Use Permit
Del Monte 1, 920 F.2d at 1503.
35. Id.
36. L
37. Id. at 1503.
38. l at 1504.
39. l
40. Id
41. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.s. at 697.
42. DelMonteI, 920 F.2d at 1503. NOW, THEREFORE, BE iT RESOLVED THAT THE COUNCIL
OF THE CITY OF MONTEREY FINDS: 1. The site is not physically suitable for the type and density of
development proposed, in that sand relocation and grading necessary for construction of the project results
in significant environmental impacts that are not rmtigable nor adequately addressed given the current size
of the project. 2. The site is further not physically suitable for the type and density of development proposed
in that significant impacts upon the native flora and fauna habitat will result which are not adequately
mitigated in this proposal. 3. The site is further not physically suitable for the project proposed in that the
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was not approved. Some of the proffered reasons for denying the extension
were that the site was not physically suitable for the level of development and
that the development was likely to cause substantial environmental damage
and substantial injury to the SBB. The denial of the 190-unit development
plan came at a time when a sewer moratorium from another agency would
prevent development based on new plans.43
In 1986, after five years, five formal decisions, and nineteen different site
plans submitted by Del Monte and its predecessor in interest Ponderosa, Del
Monte decided the city would not permit development of the property under
any circumstances, and did not submit another development plan. Instead, Del
Monte submitted a complaint in court. In December 1991, while still fighting
the city in court, Del Monte finally sold the property to the state of California
to be used as a park. It received $4,500,000 for the property, only $800,000
more than the property was purchased for seven years earlier.'
B. Procedural History
1. Del Monte I
In 1986, Del Monte commenced suit against the city of Monterey in the
United States District Court for the Northern Distnct of California.45 Del
Monte asserted that the city council's findings in Resolution Number 86-96
(resolution not allowing time extension for the use permit) were in direct
contradiction to those previously made in Resolution Number 84-160 (resolu-
tion approving development subject to fifteen conditions), and the denial of
the 190-unit development plan was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. "6
Del Monte alleged that the purported reasons for denying the 190-unit devel-
opment plan did not reflect the city's real motivation, which Del Monte argued
was the city's intent to preserve the property and devote it to open space with-
47out paying just compensation.
design of the subdivision does not provide adequate access to and from the property over lands owned or
controlled by the developer, and as proposed the project fails to provide adequate easements or other legally
acceptable means of insuring access to this project in the future. 4. The design of the subdivision, as noted
in 2 and 3 above, is likely to cause substantial environmental damage and substantially injure the habitat
of the endangered Smith's Blue Butterfly. 5. The project as submitted is not in conformance with the
General Plan, in that it fails to protect important native flora and fauna as required in Policy 10, page B-6.
6. The project will have a significant effect on the environment, and no demonstration of ovemding consid-
erations has been made which would support approval of this project. Id.
43. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 697.
44. Dwight H. Mermam, Will this Mouse Roar? United States Supreme Court Takes a Takings Case,
SEI8 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 297, 301 (1999).
45. Del Monte 1, 920 F.2d at 1496.
46. Id. at 1505.
47. Id.
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Del Monte's complaint set out eight separate counts,48 five of which were
substantive claims based on the Fifth Amendment's taking clause as incorpo-
rated to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, the due process and
equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, and common law
principles of estoppel and unjust enrichment.49 In the remaining three counts,
Del Monte requested an injunction against the city, declaratory relief under 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201-02, and relief from civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.50
The city moved to dismiss Del Monte's complaint or in the alternative
moved for summary judgment5 Del Monte responded with an amended
complaint and filed its own motion for summary judgment with extensive
affidavits supporting the factual allegations of the complaint. 2
The district court dismissed Del Monte's taking claim as unripe for review
because Del Monte had "shown nothing more than the uncertainty of Califor-
nia' s compensation procedures for regulatory takings." 3 Relying on William-
son County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank 4 the district
court held that Del Monte had to return to state court and test state procedures
before the taking claim would be ripe for federal review 55 The district court
then dismissed Del Monte's unjust enrichment claim as an impermissible
variant of the taking claim.56 The district court also held that Del Monte's due
process and equal protection claims were unripe, but alternately dismissed the
claims for failure to state a claim. 7 The district court also dismissed the
estoppel claim for failure to state a claim.58 Finally, the district court deter-
mined that "the remedial claims had no basis independent of the five substan-
tive claims and dismissed the entire complaint." 59
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the decision was reversed in part.60 The
Ninth Circuit considered all of Del Monte's claims as having been disposed
of by summary judgment, requiring de novo review 6' The appellate court
initially addressed whether Del Monte's taking claim was ripe for review and
determined that the finality requirement of the taking claim was satisfied
48. See generally Karena C. Anderson, Strategic Litigating in Land Use Cases: Del Monte Dunes v.
City ofMonterey, 25 ECOLoGYL.Q. 465 (1998) (explaining the strategic advantage to property owners who
assert several claims by combining their regulatory takings claim with challenges under alternative constitu-
tional theories such as the equal protection and due process clauses).
49. Del Monte Dunes, 920 F.2d at 1500.
50. lId
51. Id. at 1499 n.1.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1507.
54. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
55. Del Monte 1, 920 F.2d at 1506-07.
56. Id. at 1500.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Idt at 1509.
61Id.l at 1499 n.1.
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because the city essentially reached a final decision.' The Ninth Circuit relied
on MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v County of Yolo63 and the United States
Supreme Court's acknowledgment that the finality requirement does not com-
pel a property owner to pursue a development application through piecemeal
litigation or unfair procedures.64 The court also deterrmned that the compensa-
tion requirement of the taking claim was ripe for review because at the time
the city rejected Del Monte's last development application, "California law
did not permit property owners to seek compensation for a regulatory taking
through an action for inverse condemnation" in state court.
Next, the Ninth Circuit determined that Del Monte's due process and equal
protection claims were ripe for review because Del Monte showed that it
would have been futile to seek approval of another development plan.66 The
Ninth Circuit also found that Del Monte's due process and equal protection
claims stated claims for which relief could be granted.67 The court held that
Del Monte's due process claim needed to be determined after a trial on the
merits because there was a question of fact whether the city's actions were
arbitrary and irrational. 6' The appellate court also held that Del Monte's equal
protection claim needed to be determined after a trial on the merits because
there was a question of fact whether the city had imposed the same environ-
mental and access conditions on similarly used property surrounding the 37.6
acre parcel.69
Following this analysis, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the
remedial claims for injunctive relief, declaratory relief under 42 U.S.C. §§
2201-02, and relief from civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.70
Finally, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the estoppel and unjust
enrichment claims and remanded the case for a trial on the merits.7'
2. Del Monte l
On remand, the district court ordered that the takings and equal protection
claims be tried to a jury, but reserved the substantive due process claim for a
decision by the court because it was a question of law 72 At the close of trial,
the district court instructed the jury, with written instructions essentially pre-
62. Id. at 1501-06.
63. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
64. Del Monte 1, 920 F.2d. at 1501-07.
65. Id. at 1507.
66. Id. at 1507-09.
67. Id. at 1509.
68. Id. at 1508.
69. Id. at 1509.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd. v. City of Monterey, 95 F.3d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1996)
(hereinafter Del Monte I1).
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pared by the city, that it should find for Del Monte if it found that Del Monte
had been demed all economically viable use of the property or if it found that
the city's decision to reject Del Monte's 190-unit development plan did not
substantially advance a legitimate public purpose.73 The jury delivered a
general verdict in favor of Del Monte on the taking claim, a separate verdict
for Del Monte on the equal protection claim and a damage award of
$1,450,000. 74 After the jury's verdict, the district court held that the city did
not violate Del Monte's substantive due process rights because the city as-
serted valid regulatory reasons for denying Del Monte's 190-unit development
plan.7" The district court reasoned that its ruling on the substantive due pro-
cess claim was not inconsistent with thejury's verdict. The district court then
demed the city's motions for ajudgment as a matter of law and a new trial on
both the takings and equal protection claims.7 6
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the jury verdict was affirmed. The Ninth
Circuit stated that the jury verdict could be affirmed if substantial evidence
supported either the taking claim or the equal protection claim.77 The Ninth
Circuit upheld thejury verdict solely on the taking claim and therefore did not
reach the equal protection claim.7"
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the city's argument that Del Monte had no
right to ajury trial in an action for inverse condemnation pursuant to either 42
U.S.C. § 1983 or the Seventh Amendment.79 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that
because § 1983 grants a party the right to bring an "action at law" or a "suit
in equity," a party who brings an "action at law" under § 1983 has a right to-
ajury trial.8" The Ninth Circuit then determined that an inverse condemnation
73. The district court's jury instruction with regard to the economically viable use inquiry read as
follows: "For the purpose of a taking claim, you will find that the plaintiffhas been denied all economically
viable use of its property, if, as the result of the city's regulatory decision there remains no permissible or
beneficial use for that property. In proving whether the plaintiff has been denied all economically viable
use of its property, it is not enough that the plaintiff show that after the challenged action by the city the
property diminshed in value or that it would suffer serious economic loss as the result of the city's ac-
tions.'Te district court's jury instruction with regard to the substantially advance inquiry read as follows:
"Public bodies, such as the city, have the authority to take actions which substantially advance legitimate
public interest and legitimate public interests can include protecting the environment, preserving open space
agriculture, protecting the health and safety of its citizens, and regulating the quality of the community by
looking at development. So one ofyourjobs as jurors is to decide if the city's decision here substantially
advanced any such legitimate public purpose. The regulatory actions of the city or any agency substantially
advance a legitimate public purpose if the action bears a reasonable relationship to that objective.
Now, if the preponderance of the evidence establishes that there was no reasonable relationship between
the city's denial of the.. .proposal and legitimate public purpose, you should find in favor of the plaintiff.
If you find that there existed a reasonable relationship between the city's decision and a legitimate public
purpose, you should find in favor of the city. As long as the regulatory action by the city substantially
advances their legitimate public purpose... its underlying motives and reasons are not to be inquired into."
Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 700-01.
74. Del Monte If, 95 F.3d at 1425.
75. Id
76. Id
77. Id at 1426.
78. Id
79. Id.
80. Id at 1427.
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action was an "action at law," analogous to a "suit at common law" because
legal relief was available and legal rights were asserted.8
Next, the Ninth Circuit rejected the city's argument that even if § 1983
grants a right to a jury trial, the district court should not have submitted the
issue of liability on the inverse condemnation claim to the jury because it
presented a question of law 82 The Ninth Circuit held that it was permissible
to submit the inverse condemnation claim to thejury on the theories explained
in the jury instructions because the theories required factual determinations.83
Finally, the Ninth Circuit considered the district court's denial of the city's
motion forjudgment notwithstanding the verdict on the inverse condemnation
claim. In reasoning why the denial of the city's motion was not error, the
Ninth Circuit relied on Dolan v. City of Tigard84 to support the conclusion that
substantial evidence was presented to support a finding that the City's actions
did not substantially advance a legitimate public purpose.85 The court also
relied on Dolan in stating that "[even if the City had a legitimate interest in
denying Del Monte's development application, its action must be 'roughly
proportional' to furthering that interest That is, the City's denial must be
related 'both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed develop-
ment.'
86
The Ninth Circuit also rejected the city's argument that because Del Monte
sold the property to the state for $800,000 more than it paid, economically
viable use of the property existed.87 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that liability
in inverse condemnation actions based on a denial of economically viable use
focuses on the use of the property, not its value.88 The Ninth Circuit then
concluded that substantial evidence supported a finding that the City's actions
denied Del Monte economically viable use of the property 89
III. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S REASONING AND HOLDING IN
DEL MONTE DUNES
The Court's decision in Del Monte Dunes addressed three issues: 1)
whether questions of liability in an inverse condemnation action brought under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 can properly be submitted to a jury, 2) whether the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit impermissibly based its decision
on a standard that allowed a jury to reweigh the reasonableness of a city's land
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1428.
83. Id.
84. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
85. Del Monte 11, at 1430.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1432.
88. Id. at 1433.
89. Id. at 1434.
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use decision, and 3) whether the Ninth Circuit erred in assuming that the rough
proportionality standard announced in Dolan v. City of Tigard applied to the
facts presented for review 90
In writing the 5-4 opimon for the Court, Justice Kennedy addressed the
issues in reverse order and stated that the Court "need not decide all of the
questions presented nor need we. examine each of the points given by
the Court of Appeals in its decision to affirm."' Instead, Justice Kennedy
stated that the controlling issue was "whether the matter was properly
submitted to the jury "92 Justice Scalia wrote a special concurring opinion on
the first and controlling issue andjoined in all other parts of Justice Kennedy's
opinion. Justice Souterjoined in all aspects of Justice Kennedy's opinion, but
filed a dissenting opimon on the first and controlling issue.
A. Issue One: May Questions of Liability in an Inverse Condemnation
Action Brought under 42 U.S. C. § 1983 Properly be Submitted to a Jury?
According to the Court, the answer to the first and controlling issue de-
pended on whether the property owner had a statutory right under § 1983 or
a constitutional right under the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial, and if it
did, what was the nature and extent of the right.93 The Court first addressed
whether the phrase "action at law" contained in § 1983 was a term of art im-
plying a right to ajury trial.94 The Court stated that based solely on the phrase
"action at law" the property owner did not have a statutory right to ajury trial
under § 1983."5
The Court then focused on the Seventh Amendment and stated that its inter-
pretation of the Seventh Amendment has been guided by a historical analysis
comprised of two requirements: 1) whether the Court was dealing with a cause
of action that was either tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least
analogous to one that was, and 2) whether the particular trial decision must fall
to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common law right as it
existed in 1791.96
With respect to the first inquiry, the Court stated that it has recogmzed that
"suits at common law" include not just those suits which the common law
recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but also those "suits in
which legal rights were to be ascertained and determined. 97 The Court then
concluded that the Seventh Amendment applies "not only to common-law
causes of action but also to statutory causes of action analogous to common
law causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts in the late 18th
90. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 702.
91. Id. at 694.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 707.
94. l at 707-08.
95. l at 708.
96. Id. (quoting Markmon v. Westview Instruments Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996)).
97. Id. (quoting Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 447 (1830)).
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century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity or admi-
ralty "98
The Court concluded that the property owner brought its suit pursuant to §
1983 to vindicate its constitutional rights. The Court then held that a "§ 1983
suit seeking legal relief is an action at law within the meaning of the Seventh
Amendment."99 Specifically, the Court stated that the property owner had
sought legal relief and that "[ilt was entitled to proceed in federal court under
§ 1983 because, at the time of the city's actions, the State of California did not
provide a compensatory remedy for temporary regulatory takings."" To
support this statement, the Court referred to the mandate of First English
which requires states to provide a monetary remedy for regulatory takings.'0 '
The Court reasoned that the constitutional injury alleged by the property
owner was that the property was taken withoutjust compensation and had the
city paid for the property or had an adequate post-deprivation remedy been
available, the property owner would have suffered no constitutional injury
from the taking alone.' 2
The Court then addressed the city's suggestion that it look at the underlying
constitutional right asserted by the property owner, rather than the statutory
basis for asserting the right.0 3 The city argued that because there is not a
constitutional right to a jury trial in a formal condemnation action, there
should not be one in an inverse condemnation action. The Court rejected this
argument by stating that "a condemnation action differs in important respects
from a § 1983 action to redress an uncompensated taking."' ' Most impor-
tantly the Court noted that when the government initiates condemnation pro-
ceedings, liability is not an issue because the government "concedes the land-
owner's right to receive just compensation and seeks a mere determination of
the amount of compensation due."'0 5 The Court concluded its initial inquiry
98. Id. at 708-09 (quoting Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 348 (1998))
99. Id. at 709.
100. Id. at 710.
101. Id. (citing First English, 482 U.S. at 308-11).
102. Id. (Citing Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 194-95) (articulating the finality and exhaustion
requirements of the ripeness doctrine).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 711-12.
105. Id. at 712. The regulatory takings doctrine is based on the distinction between an eminent domain
(condemnation) proceeding and an action for inverse condemnation. The phrase eminent domain "refers
to a legal proceeding in which a government asserts its authority to condemn property." Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 258 n.2 (1980) (citing United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 255-58 (1980)).
Eminent domain has also been defined as the "power inherent in a sovereign state of taking or of authoriz-
ing the taking of any property within its jurisdiction for a public use or benefit." Boise Cascade Corp. v.
Board of Forestry, 935 P.2d 411,414 n. 1 (Or. 1997) (quoting GTE Northwest, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm n,
900 P.2d 495. 500 (Or. 1995)).
By contrast, inverse condemnation is a "shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner
recovers just compensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not been
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by reasoning that historically, "when the government has taken property
without providing an adequate means for obtaining redress, suits to recover
just compensation have been framed as common-law tort actions."' I°
With respect to the second inquiry of whether the decision must fall to the
jury in order to preserve the substance of the common law right, the Court
asked whether particular issues of liability in an inverse condemnation action
can properly be determined by ajury To answer this question the Court stated
that it must first look to history for guidance and then to precedent and func-
tional considerations." 7 Finding no guidance from history or precedent, the
Court focused on considerations of process and function. The Court stated
that "[i]n actions at law predominantly factual issues are in most cases allo-
cated to the jury "'0 In applying this principle the Court recognized that
regulatory taking cases depend on the particular facts. Finally, the Court held
that the question of whether a property owner has been deprived of all eco-
nomically viable use of hIs property is predominantly factual in nature and the
jury's role in determining whether a land use decision substantially advances
a legitimate public interest is best understood as a mixed question of fact and
law " Accordingly, the Court held it was proper to submit the "narrow,
factbound" issue to the jury 110
B. Issue Two: Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit Impermissibly Base its Decision on a Standard that Allowed a
Jury to Reweigh the Reasonableness of a City's Land Use Decision?
In deciding the second issue, the Court addressed the city of Monterey's
instituted." Agins 447 U.S. at 258 n.2 (quoting Clarke, 445 U.S. at 255-58). Essentially, inverse condem-
nation refers to a claim against a governmental agency to recover the value of the property taken by the
agency although no formal exercise of the power of ermnent domain has been completed by the taking
agency. Boise Cascade Corp., 935 P.2d at 414 n.1 (citing Lincoln Loan v. State Hwy. Comm., 545 P.2d
105, 106 n.I (Or. 1976)).
Thus, eminent domain is the power of the government to take private property for public use by paying
the property ownerjust compensation, whereas inverse condemnation is a descriptive term describing the
legal action a property owner initiates when the government has taken her private property for public use
without paying the requiredjust compensation. One final distinction between ermnent domain and inverse
condemnation is that in a condemnation proceeding the government does not contest the property has been
taken, whereas in an inverse condemnation action the property owner must prove the property was taken
as a condition precedent to recovering just compensation.
Further, the essence of the regulatory takings doctrine is based on the distinction between a physical
taking and a regulatory taking. Aphysical taking is where the government actually physically intrudes upon
property. Waste Management Inc. v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville & Davidson County, 130 F. 3d 73 1,
737 (6th Cir. 1997). A regulatory taking is when a regulatory or administrative action places such burdens
on the ownership of private property that essential elements of ownership must be viewed as having been
taken, even if the regulatory or administrative action has not deprived the owner of title or possession.
Hendler v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 574, 585 (1996).
106. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 715.
107. Il at718.
108. Id
109. Id at 720-21.
110. Id at721.
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challenge to the "Court of Appeals' holding that thejury could have found the
city's denial of the final development plan not reasonably related to legitimate
public interests.""' The Court thought the argument "obscure" because the
city did not challenge the sufficiency of evidence, but instead argued that "as
a matter of law, its land use decisions are immune fromjudicial scrutiny under
all circumstances."". The Court focused on the legal theories contained in the
jury instructions, the essence of which were proposed by the city, and stated
that the legal theories were consistent with the Court's previous discussions
of regulatory takings liability 113 The Court explicitly declined to accept the
suggestion of the city and its amici to reconsider the Court's prior decisions
developing the regulatory takings doctrine. The Court rejected this argument
and disposed of the issue by holding that it was "contrary to settled regulatory
takings principles."
'' 14
C. Issue Three: Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit Err in Assuming that the Rough Proportionality Standard Announc-
ed in Dolan v City of Tigard Applied to the Facts Presented for Review?
In disposing of the third issue, the Court stated that, although in a general
sense concerns for proportionality animate the takings clause, it has not ex-
tended the rough proportionality standard announced in Dolan beyond exac-
tion cases or those cases involving land-use decisions conditioning approval
of development on the dedication of private property to public use.' The
Court stated that the rough proportionality standard announced in Dolan was
inapposite to the property owner's challenge of a denial of a development
111. Id. at 703-04.
112. Id. at 707.
113. Id. at 706. The legal theory used in the jury instructions in Del Monte Dunes originated from the
Court's decision in Agms v. City of Tiburon 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In Agins, relying in part on the regula-
tory taking cases of Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), and Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 483 U.S. 104, 138 n.6 (1978), the Court stated that the "application of a general zoning law to
particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests
or denies an owner economically viable use of his land." 447 U.S. at 260. Some scholars have pointed out
that the Court's decision in Nectow does not refer to the Fifth Amendment, but to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Based on this observation these scholars argue that the "substantially advance a legitimate state
interest" prong as set forth in Agins and followed in Del Monte Dunes should be regarded as a substantive
due process test rather than a regulatory takings standard. David L. Callies, Regulatory' Takings and the
Supreme Court: How Perspectives on Property Rights have Changed from Penn Central to Dolan, and
What State and Federal Courts are Doing About It, 28 STETSON L. REV. 523, 524 n.4 (1999); see also John
D. Echevema, Revving the Engines in Neutral: City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,
29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10682, 10686-87 (1999); Steven J. Eagle, Del Monte Dunes, Good Faith, and Land Use
Regulation, 30 ENVTL. L. REP 10100 (2000).
114. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 707.
115. Id. at 702.
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plan." 6 However, the Court held that the "the Court of Appeals' discussion
of rough proportionality was unnecessary" and irrelevant to the Court's
disposition of the case."7
D. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
Justice Scalia began his concurring opinion by stating that all § 1983 "ac-
tions must be treated alike insofar as the Seventh Amendment right tojury trial
is concerned."... According to Justice Scalia, the Court's Seventh Amend-
ment analysis should focus on the nature of the statutory action, not the claim
that may be brought under it.1 9 Disagreeing with Justice Souter, Justice Scalia
argued that § 1983 is "a prism through which many different lights may pass...
[and] m analyzing tus cause of action for Seventh Amendment purposes, the
proper focus is on the prism itself, not on the particular ray that happens to be
passing through."' 20
According to Justice Scalia, the fact that a violation of the Fifth Amendment
may give rise to another action other than a § 1983 suit, namely an inverse
condemnation suit is irrelevant. The critical question, he claimed is whether
a § 1983 suit is entitled to a jury 121 Relying on Wilson v. Garcia22 for the
proposition that all § 1983 actions should be characterized as tort actions for
the recovery of damages, Justice Scalia reasoned that there is no doubt that the
cause of action created by § 1983 is currently, and was always, regarded as a
tort claim.l"
However, Justice Scalia also pointed out that to say that the property owner
in Del Monte Dunes had a right to ajury trial on the § 1983 claim is not to say
that the property owner was entitled to have the jury decide every issue.'24
Justice Scalia relied on Justice Kennedy's methodology which focused on the
historical practice thatjunes make primarily factual determinations and judges
116. One author argues that the Court's holding on the third issue in Del Monte Dunes leaves the
following issue unresolved: "the extent to which the 'rough proportionality' test established by the Supreme
Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard and found not applicable in Del Monte Dunes, will be applied to land-use
exactions other than land dedications." Nancy E. Stroud,A Review of Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey
and its Implications for Local Government Exactions, 15 J. LAND USE & ENVTL L. 195 (1999). While
addressing this unresolved issue is beyond the scope of this note, the Court in Del Monte Dunes did not hold
that the rough proportionality standard announced in Dolan would never apply to land-use exactions other
than land dedications. in fact that question was effectively answered in the positive by Ehrlich v. City of
Culver City, 12 Cal. 4th 854 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 929 (1996). What the Court was saying in Del
Monte Dunes was that the Dolan rough proportionality standard is not applicable to a property owner's
challenge not based on excessive exactions. Because the property owner in Del Monte Dunes did not plead
or challenge the excessive exactions imposed by the city, the Dolan rough proportionality test could not be
applied to the facts presented for review.
117. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 703.
118. Id. at 723 (Scalia, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 724.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
123. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 726.
124. Id. at 731.
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resolve legal questions. Applying this reasoning to the facts of Del Monte
Dunes, Justice Scalia focused on the two questions presented to the jury- 1)
whether the property owner was deprived of all economically viable use of the
property, and 2) whether the city's 1986 rejection of the property owner's
building plans substantially advanced a legitimate public interest.
Justice Scalia agreed with the majority that the first question presented
primarily a question of fact appropriate for consideration by a jury 125 The
second question, according to Scalia, required division into two subquestions:
a) whether the government's asserted basis for its challenged action repre-
sented a legitimate state interest, and b) whether that legitimate state interest
was substantially furthered by the challenged government action. 126 According
to Justice Scalia, the subquestion presented a question of law and was prop-
erly removed from consideration by thejury on the court's instruction. Justice
Scalia then agreed that the second issue "at least in the highly particularized
context" of Del Monte Dunes was a question of fact for the jury 127
E. Justice Souter's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter agreed with the majority that the
appropriate considerations in Del Monte Dunes were: 1) whether the cause of
action in question was tried at law at the time of the founding or was at least
analogous to a traditional at law action and; 2) whether the particular trial
decision must fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common
law right as it existed in 1791.128 Justice Souter's disagreement with the ma-
jority as to how this standard applied to the facts presented for review was
based on his agreement with the city that the "analogy of inverse condemna-
tion proceedings to direct ones is intuitively sensible, given their common
Fifth Amendment constitutional source and link to the sovereign's power of
eminent domain., 129 According to Justice Souter, the ultimate issue in both
direct and inverse condemnation actions is identical- a deterrmnation of the
fair market value of the property taken. 3' From this single premise, Justice
Souter concluded that an inverse condemnation action at common law was
analogous to a direct condemnation action, and accordingly, that the right to
compensation for a direct taking camed with it no right to a jury trial. '3'
IV ANALYSIS
The Court's decision in Del Monte Dunes represents a synthesis of several
125. Id. at 732.
126. Id. at 732.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 733 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion at 708) (internal quotations omitted).
129. Id. at 734.
130. Id.
131. Id. at739-40.
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issues that animate the Fifth Amendment's takings clause.132 The case impli-
cates the range of takings issues including the ripeness doctrine, the history of
the regulatory takings doctrine"'3 and Court's exactionjurisprudence.'34 How-
ever, because the ripeness doctrine is a hurdle that every property owner must
leap,'35 the Court's decision in Del Monte Dunes will further compound the
frustration property owners experience when they find they can't jump high
enough. While the Court's decision m Del Monte Dunes did not specifically
address the issue of ripeness, 13 6 the Court's reasoning was premised on the
reality that granting a right to a jury trial in a inverse condemnation suit
brought pursuant to § 1983 may be practically irrelevant due to the ripeness
doctrine. Not only did the Court create a right to a jury trial and then reaffirm
a roadblock, the Court's decision will further complicate the extent to which
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and concerns for res judicata and collateral
estoppel will limit a property owner's right to a jury trial upon satisfying the
ripeness doctrine.
A. The Ripeness Doctnne
Ripeness is a threshold determination and a specific category ofjusticiabili-
ty that requires federal courts to determine whether a case has matured or
ripened into a controversy worthy of adjudication. 137 The ripeness doctrine "is
generally viewed as being both constitutionally required [by Article EEI's case
or controversy mandate] andjudicially prudent."' 3 According to the ripeness
doctrine, a federal court cannot reach the merits of a property owner's regula-
tory taking claim unless the property owner can satisfy the following two
requirements: 1) that the government's decision regarding the application of
132. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that private property shall not "be taken for public use, without
just compensation." U.S. CONsT. amend. V The Fifth Amendment applies to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,241 (1897).
Further, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee was "designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960). When it is determined that government action violated
that Fifth Amendment, it is a "determunation that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear
the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(1980).
133. See supra note 113.
134. The two cases comprising the Court's exaction jurisprudence are Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
135. See generally Michael M. BergerDel Monte Dunes: A Viewfrom the Owner's Perspective, SD40
A.LL-A.B.A. 497,499 (1999) (stating that "[t]hose familiar with regulatory taking cases.., know that the
most difficult part of the case is not proving either the taking or that amount of damage to the jury. The
hardest part of the case is proving to the court that the case is 'ripe' enough to go to trial at all"); Nancie
G. Marzulla & Roger J. Marzulla, PROPERTY RIGHTS: UNDERSTANDING GOVERNMENT TAKINGS AND
ENvIRoNmENTAL REGULATION 143-55 (1997) (discussing the practical difficulties and heavy burden the
ripeness doctrine places on property owners asserting a regulatory takng claim).
136. This issue was decided by the Ninth Circuit four years after Del Monte Dunes brought suit in Del
Monte L Del Monte I, 920 F.2d at 1501-07.
137. BLAcK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1328 (6th ed. 1990).
138. Gregory M. Stein, Regulatory Takings and Ripeness in the Federal Courts, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1,
11(1995).
162 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW [Vol.21
the regulation to the property was final, which is determined by application,
adnimistrative, and reapplication thresholds; and 2) that the property owner
sought and was deniedjust compensation through the state's inverse condem-
nation procedures, or is able to show that the state's procedures are inadequate
on their face or are not available by judicial or administrative means.'39 How-
ever, the ripeness doctnne does not apply to all regulatory taking claims.'"
Generally, the ripeness doctnne only applies to as-applied challenges, or those
challenges asserting that a regulation as it is applied to a particular piece of
property constitutes a taking. 4' The ripeness doctnne is not generally applica-
ble to facial regulatory taking challenges, or those challenges asserting that the
adoption of the regulation itself constitutes a taking. 42
B. The Supreme Court's Development of the Ripeness Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court's development of the npeness doctnne,
much like its development of the regulatory takings doctnne, has been piece-
meal at best.'43 The Court's most recent pronouncement of the npeness doc-
trine was its 1997 decision of Suitum v Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.'"
In Suitum, the Court specifically addressed the development of the npeness
doctrine. The Court stated that there are two independent hurdles to a regula-
tory taking claim brought against a state in federal court. "' The Court stated
that a property owner must: 1) demonstrate that she has received a final deci-
sion from the governmental entity charged with applying the challenged regu-
lation to the affected property; and 2) have sought compensation "through the
procedures the state has provided for doing so."'46 The Court explained that
the first requirement follows from the pnnciple that "only a regulation that
goes too far results in a taking under the Fifth Amendment."'47 The second
requirement stems from the Fifth Amendment's provision that only takings
without just compensation violate the Constitution. 148
139. Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness and
Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983 Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP L.J. 73, 77-83 (1988).
140. See Michalel K. Whitman, The Ripeness Doctrine in the Land-Use Context: The Municipality s
Ally and the Landowner s Nemesis, 29 URB. LAW. 13, 24-25 (1997).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See generally, James E. Kner, The Takings-Puzzle Puzzle, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1143, 1150
(1997).
144. 520 U.S. 725 (1997) (because the property owner had effectively received a final decision from
the government, even though she did not attempt to sell the transferable development nghts available to her
under the challenged land use regulation, the Court remanded the case for the lower court to determine if
a taking occurred).
145. Id. at 733-34.
146. Id. at 734 (quoting Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
186, 194 (1985)).
147. Id. (internal citations omitted).
148. Id. at 734 (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 195).
DEL MONTE DUNES
While the Court's articulation of the ripeness doctrine seems clear, deter-
mining what is a final decision and what state court procedures are required
to be satisfied is a difficult task. The development of the final decision prong
proceeded with the Court deciding that a property owner must: a) reapply for
approval upon being turned down; b) actually submit a development plan; and
c) apply for any available variances. 49 The development of the state proce-
dure or exhaustion prong proceeded with the Court deciding that states have
to provide a monetary remedy for a (temporary) regulatory taking. 5'
1. Final Decision
a. Re-Application
While not explicitly labeling it as such, the Court's first expression of the
ripeness doctrine was in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.151
In Penn Central, the Court addressed the validity of New York City's Land-
marks Preservation Law which placed restrictions on the development of
individual historic landmarks and prohibited the construction of a fifty-five
story tower atop Grand Central Station because it had been designated a land-
mark. ' 2 After reaching the merits of the case and rejecting the property
owner's regulatory taking claim, the Court turned to the property owner's
argument that New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law prohibited it
from occupying any portion of the airspace above Grand Central Station.15 1
The Court rejected this argument by stating that "nothing suggests an
intention to prohibit any construction above the Terminal" and "[s]ince appel-
lants have not sought approval for the construction of a smaller structure, we
do not know that appellants will be demed any use of any portion of the air-
space above the Terminal."'154
Nearly a decade after the Court's decision in Penn Central and its sugges-
tion of a reapplication threshold, the Court decided MacDonald, Sommer &
Frates v. Yolo County.15 In MacDonald, a property owner asserted a regula-
tory taking claim after one tentative subdivision map proposal for 159 single-
family and multi-family residential lots was rejected by the Yolo County
Planmng Commission.'56 The Court suggested that its takings jurisprudence
reflects an insistence on knowing the nature and extent of the permitted devel-
opment before adjudicating the constitutionality of the regulations that purport
to limit It. 157 The Court held that the taking claim was not ripe because the
property owner could have reapplied to the planning commission with another
149. See zd. at 735-39..
150. Id. at 739-40.
151. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
152. l at 107, 115-18.
153. Id. at 135-38.
154. Id. at 137.
155. 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
156. Id. at 342, 348.
157. Id. at 348-49 (citations omitted).
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development plan, and there was a possibility that some development of the
property would be approved. 5 8 The Court stated that the "rejection of exceed-
ingly grandiose development plans does not logically imply that less ambitious
plans will receive similarly unfavorable reviews.""59 However, the Court did
acknowledge that a property owner is not required to resort to futile, piecemeal
litigation or otherwise unfair procedures in order to obtain approval or disap-
proval of a development plan. 6"
b. Application
In 1980, the Court decided Agins v City of Tiburon.16 1 In Agins, the Court
addressed the validity of a zoning ordinance imposing density restrictions
which allowed only the construction of one to five single-family residences on
an individual tract."62 Because the property owner asserted a facial challenge
to the zoning ordinance, the Court stated that the question before it was wheth-
er the mere enactment of a zoning ordinance constituted a taking. '63 The Court
in Agins stated that for a takings claim to be ripe for review at least one devel-
opment plan needs to be submitted for review at the local level."6 The Court
held that because the property owners had failed to even apply for develop-
ment approval, they were free to pursue their reasonable investment expecta-
tions by submitting a development plan to local officials. 165 The Court further
reasoned that without at least one application, the Court could not determine
whether the impact of the general land use regulation denied the property
owners the "justice and fairness" guaranteed them by the Fifth Amendment. 166
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v San Diego167 the Court dismissed the
company's regulatory taking claim on appeal. Important to the Court was the
fact that the company had not submitted a development plan to the city; there-
fore, it did not appear that the city's rezoning and adoption of an open space
plan had deprived the company of all beneficial use of its property 16' The
Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction because the lower court
failed to decide if a taking had occurred. 169 Specifically, the Court noted that
federal law permits the Court to only review final judgments and decrees of
a state court, and because the Court determined that the lower court's decision
158. Id. at 352-53.
159. Id. at 353 n.9.
160. Id. at 350 n.7.
161. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
162. Id. at 257.
163. Id. at 260.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 262.
166. Id. at 262-63 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S at 124).
167. 450U.S. 621 (1981).
168. Id. at 631 n.12.
169. Id. at631-33.
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was not final, it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the suit. 170
c. Application For Variances
In Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank
171
the Court squarely addressed when an inverse condemnation suit brought
pursuant to § 1983 was ripe for review 172 In Williamson County, the Court
overturned ajury's verdict determimng that there had been a temporary regula-
tory taking and awarding compensation to the property owner in the amount
of $350,000.17 The Court held that even though the property owner had sub-
nutted a plan for development, it did not seek variances authorized by the
subdivision and zomng ordinances and therefore had not obtained a final
decision regarding the application of the ordinances." The Court stated that
a taking of property "is not ripe until the government entity charged with
implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the appli-
cation of the regulations to the property at issue.' 7 The Court held that the
taking claim was not ripe due to the property owner's failure to seek a variance
available under the regulation.I16
2. Exhaustion of State Procedures
The Court's decision in Williamson County also set forth the requirement
that a property owner must seek and be deniedjust compensation through state
procedures before a taking claim will be ripe for federal review In William-
son County the Court stated that the "Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the
taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation."' The
Court stated that a taking claim is not complete until a state "fails to provide
adequate compensation for the taking.'17 The holding in Williamson County
was based on the availability of a Tennessee statute that provided procedures
to obtain just compensation for a regulatory taking under "certain circum-
stances."'' 7 9 Tennessee case law held that the "certain circumstance" under the
statute included a circumstance where a taking was affected by restrictive
zoning laws or development regulations. 8 ° Therefore, the Court stated that
there was a failure of proof on the property owner's part because the owner
failed to show that an inverse condemnation procedure was unavailable or
inadequate at the state level. ' Subsequently, the Court held that the property
170. aL at 633.
171. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
172. Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186-87.
173. IL at 175, 200.
174. Id. at 186-87.
175. Id. at 186.
176. Id. at 190.
177. Id. at 194.
178. Id. at 195.
179. Id. at 196.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 196-97.
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owner's taking claim was not ripe for review because the property owner did
not seek compensation through the procedures provided by the state.1
8 2
In 1987, the Court decided First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles.8 3 In First English, the Court addressed the validity
of a zoning ordinance that prohibited the property owner from constructing
anything on its property 184 The Court held that the Fifth Amendment requires
a state to provide a monetary remedy for regulatory takings in order to insure
just compensation. 85 The Court stated that temporary takings which "deny a
landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent
takings, for which the Constitution clearly requires a remedy based on compen-
sation."' 18
6
C. Del Monte Dunes, Rooker-Feldman, Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel
Del Monte Dunes is a regulatory takings case frozen in time. The orginal
development application was submitted in 1981, the original proceeding com-
menced in 1986, the first decision of the Ninth Circuit was issued in 1990, the
second decision of the Ninth Circuit was issued in 1996, and the final decision
of the United States Supreme Court was handed down in 1999 Because the
original proceeding was commenced in 1986, the property owner in DelMonte
Dunes was required to satisfy the ripeness requirements of Williamson County;
however, at the time Del Monte Dunes was filed, the state of California did not
provide a compensatory remedy for temporary regulatory takings. Due to the
lack of a compensatory remedy the property owner in Del Monte Dunes was
only required to satisfy the finality requirement of Williamson County before
commencing an action in federal court pursuant to § 1983. The Court in Del
Monte Dunes specifically points out that the property owner "was entitled to
proceed in federal court under § 1983 because, at the time of the city's actions,
the State of California did not provide a compensatory remedy for temporary
regulatory takings."' 87 Therefore, the property owner in Del Monte Dunes was
not faced with the requirement that it exhaust procedures provided by the state
before commencing an action in federal court. If the property owner in Del
Monte Dunes would have been required to exhaust procedures provided by the
state before commencing an action in federal court, the property owner's
regulatory takings claim might have been precluded by the Rooker-Feldman
182. Id. at 194.
183. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
184. Id. at 306-07.
185. Id. at 314-15.
186. Id. at 318.
187. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 710.
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doctrine or concerns for res judicata and collateral estoppel.18
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, derived from the Umted States Supreme
Court cases of Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co,'89 and District of Columbia Court
of Appeals v. Feldman,"9° provides: 1) that only the Umted States Supreme
Court has the authority to review the final decisions of a state's highest court
when that court deterimunes a federal constitutional claim; and 2) that "lower
federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear 'challenges to state court decisions
in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings' or to decide questions
'in-extricably intertwined' with state court judgements."' 9 ' The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine "bars only claims actually litigated'or claims 'inextricably
intertwined' with those actually litigated."' 92 While the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine has received little academic attention 93 it has been used as a basis by
lower federal courts in over 500 cases to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.' 94
Unlike the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars only the claims actually
litigated, the doctrine of res judicata (claim preclusion) bars all claims arising
from the same action, whether or not addressed in the state court.' 95 In addi-
tion to res judicata, the doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) bars
the re-litigation of a final determination of a legal issue or determinative fact.
When these three doctrines are applied in conjunction with the ripeness
doctrine to regulatory taking claims, the conclusion is counter-intuitive: a
private property owner ripens a case in order to get to federal court, but once
in federal court his case is dismissed because it was ripened. The Court's
decision in Del Monte Dunes further compounds this illogical conclusion
because private property owners with regulatory taking claims, and normally
egregious facts, will pound on the federal court door and assert their right
under § 1983 to a jury trial. The question of whether the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine or concerns for resjudicata and collateral estoppel will deny a private
property owner the right to enter the federal court house and present a case to
188. This note does not address the three abstention doctrines that may be applicable to regulatory
taking cases, which are: 1) the Burford abstention doctrine derived from Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315 (1943); 2) the Pullman abstention doctrine derived from Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496 (1941); and 3) the Younger abstention doctrine derived from Younger v. Hams, 401 U.S. 37
(1971).
189. 263 U.S. 413 (1923)
190. 460 U.S. 462 (1983)
191. Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in Action,
74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1085, 1087 (1999) (quoting District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 486, 483 (1983)).
192. l at 1097.
193. Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow it up? 74 NOTREDAME
I REv. 1081, 1083 n.9 (1999).
194. Sherry, supra note 196, at 1088.
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a jury has not been squarely addressed. 96 The future viability of the regula-
tory takings doctrine will be determined by the answer to this question, which
in turn requires a reexamination of the ripeness doctrine.
V CONCLUSION
Del Monte Dunes was a victory for the regulatory takings doctrine. The
Court in Del Monte Dunes focused on the facts presented for review and ruled
accordingly in order to preserve the regulatory takings doctrine and provide
Del Monte withjust compensation. However, by deciding the case on an issue
that Court thought was "largely academic, not having any continuing impor-
tance"' 197 it has done the regulatory takings doctrine a disservice. The Court
has raised new issues by failing to resolve old ones. The Court's decision in
Del Monte Dunes is to be commended for paving a road to a jury trial, but
should be challenged for reaffirming a roadblock along the way
196. See Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299 (11 th Cir. 1992) (discussing res
judicata and the possibility of reserving the ability to appeal to a federal court pursuant to Jennings v. Caddo
Parish Sch. Bd., 531 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 897 (Oct. 18, 1976); Wilkinson v.
Pitkin Bd. of County Comm'rs, 142 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1998) (discussing res judicata and collateral
estoppel); Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F 3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 923 (U.S.
Oct. 5, 1998) (discussing collateral estoppel); Agripost, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 195 F 3d 1225 (11 th
Cir. 1999) (discussing resjudicata, collateral estoppel, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
197. See supra note 1.
